基于演化博弈模型的医联体双向转诊机制策略分析
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上海工程技术大学

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上海工程技术大学研究生科研创新“分级诊疗与双向转诊的可行性分析”阶段性研究成果(E3-0903-17-01151)


Analysis on the strategy of two-way referral mechanism of Medical Union based on evolutionary game model
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Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai,201620

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    目的:为切实提高医疗资源的使用效率,缓解医疗资源分布不均等问题,研究医疗联合体模式中双向转诊的运行机制,以促进医疗资源呈合理化分布,提高医疗资源的使用效率。方法:基于演化博弈模型,动态分析了医联体内部核心医院与成员医院间的演变趋势与博弈均衡。结果:医联体双向转诊机制实施效果与政府补贴,医保报销力度,资源配置和双方利益等因素密切相关。结论:提升医保报销补贴机制,将医联体内双向转诊机制予以立法确定并采取激励措施可有效提升转诊机制运行,保证上下级医院的获利是推行双向转诊机制的前提。

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    Objective: to improve the use efficiency of medical resources and alleviate the uneven distribution of medical resources, study the operation mechanism of two-way referral in the model of Medical Federation, so as to promote the rational distribution of medical resources and improve the use efficiency of medical resources. Methods: Based on the evolutionary game model, we dynamically analyzed the evolution trend and the game equilibrium between the core hospitals and the member hospitals. Results: the effect of two-way referral mechanism is closely related to government subsidies, medical insurance reimbursement, resource allocation and bilateral interests. Conclusion: to improve the subsidy mechanism of medical insurance reimbursement, to make the two-way referral mechanism in the Medical Union and take incentive measures can effectively improve the operation of the referral mechanism, and ensure that the profit of the upper and lower level hospitals is the prerequisite for the implementation of the two-way referral mechanism.

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  • 收稿日期:2018-04-20
  • 最后修改日期:2018-08-12
  • 录用日期:2019-01-11
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